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ABSTRACT
The Impact of Credit Default Swaps on Corporate Investment Policy
by
XUE Xinshu
Master of Philosophy
Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) play an important role in the financial markets. The 
introduction of CDSs has impacts on the bond market, and the financial 
characteristics and creditworthiness of the underlying reference entities. When 
financing is not ffictionless, the investment policies of firms are related to their 
financial conditions. However, whether or how the introduction of CDS will directly 
affect the investment policy of the firm has not been examined empirically in the 
literature. To shed light on this issue, my study investigates the relation between 
credit default swaps trading and corporate investment policy for the listed firms in 
the United States using the data of CDS reference entities from 2002 to 2014. I find 
that the introduction of CDSs is negatively related to the investment decisions of 
reference entities. Furthermore, the relation is more significant when the reference 
entities have financial constraints and depend more on external credit supply. Overall, 
when a listed firm becomes a CDS reference entity, the probability of its 
underinvestment will increase. The study contributes not only to the growing 
literature on the relationship between CDS introduction and the reference firm, but 
also to the literature on corporate investment policy making.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
According to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), a 
credit default swap (CDS) is a bilateral contract framed to shift credit risk from the 
CDS buyer to the CDS seller. In a CDS transaction, the CDS buyer, which is the 
protection buyer, pays a periodic premium to the protection seller to get rid of the 
credit risk of the reference entity, which is the party on which CDS protection is 
written. The protection seller bears the credit risk of the reference entity in return for 
receiving the periodic payment. With the development of CDS markets, the impact of 
CDS contracts on the entire market has raised researchers’ attentions in the recent
years, especially during the 2008 financial crisis and 2010 Euro-zone crisis. 
According to data from Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC), the gross 
notional value of single-name CDS contacts is much larger than the net notional 
value.1 Researchers and practitioners believe that the excess amount between the 
gross notional value and net notional value is the “naked CDSs”, where the buyers 
do not hold the debt of the reference entities. The holders of naked CDSs speculate
on the credit risk of the reference entities and thus can benefit from volatile of CDS
According to ISDA, the gross notional values are “the sum of CDS contracts bought (or 
equivalently sold) for all Warehouse contracts in aggregate, by sector or for single reference entities 
displayed”. Net notional value for a reference entity is “the sum of the net protection bought by net 
buyers (or equivalently net protection sold by net sellers)”. Source: 
http://www.isdacdsmarketplace.com/exposures and activitv/top 10 cds_positions#gross notional 
For the comparison between gross notional values and net notional values, see Table 1: Gross 
notional amount and net notional amount of top 20 U.S. single-name reference entities.
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spreads. 2
Could CDS trading really affect the reference entity? Large numbers of 
theoretical and empirical researchers have examined this issue.3 They argue that the 
introduction of CDS affects the credit risk and the financial condition such as 
financing costs of reference entities, and furthermore influence the managers’ 
decision on corporate cash holdings.
From the risk-shifting angle of a CDS contract, on one hand, by shifting the 
credit risk to CDS buyers, the creditors separate the risk from interest and lend more 
to CDS firms. Thus, due to the increased credit supply, the investment of CDS 
reference entities may increase. On the other hand, the idea of an empty creditor 
problem4 drew the attention of industry analysts and scholars to the phenomena that 
CDS introduction increased the risk of the debtor. An insured creditor may have the 
incentive to push the financially-distressed debtor into an inefficient bankruptcy or 
liquidation. The reference firms of CDS contracts tend to have higher probabilities of 
credit rating downgrades and bankruptcies. Also, financially-distressed firms are 
more likely to go bankrupt when they are related to CDS transactions.5 Managers of
2 Oehmke and Zawadowski (2014) suggest holders of naked CDSs have incentives to “push” the 
CDS reference entities into distress.
3 For example, Ashcraft and Santos (2009), Bolton and Oehmke (2011), Saretto and Tookes (2013), 
Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2013), and Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2014).
4 Bolton and Oehmke (2011) point out that the CDS-protected creditors have the incentives to push 
CDS reference entities into default in order to get compensation from the CDS market, which is the 
empty creditor problem.
5 For details about the impact of CDS trading on credit risk, see Hu and Black (2008a, 2008b), Bolton
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distressed CDS firms could be more conservative in investment, or they may invest
more on risky projects. From the risk-shifting theory and agency theory, I expect that 
CDS trading has an impact on investment and the effect could be positive or 
negative.
From the information asymmetry theory, CDS trading reveals more information 
of the reference entities. Financially healthy firms could use the information 
transparency to send signals to the market to attract more investors while financially 
distressed firms tend to have more limited credit supply.
The phenomenon raises a question about whether CDS trading affects corporate 
investment decisions of the reference entities and how significant the effect is This 
question has not been explored in the literature. To fill the gap in the literature, my 
thesis explores the relationship between the CDS trading and the investment policy 
of the underlying reference entities. The four major objectives of my research are 
follows. First, the impact of the CDS trading on corporate investment policy is 
studied, specifically, to study whether the investment of the reference firms decreases 
with the trading of CDSs. Second, I investigate if the effect differs among firms with 
different financial characteristics such as the firms with different financial constraints 
and different levels of finance dependence. Lastly, I examine whether the effect *3
and Oehmke (2011), and Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2014).
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differs during the financial crisis period.
Using a sample of all listed companies in the United States with or without CDS 
trading (excluding financial institutions) and quarterly data from January 2002 to 
December 2014 in my thesis, the following results are obtained. I find strong 
evidence that CDS trading decreases the investment of CDS reference entities even 
after controlling for firm size, age, growth opportunity and financial healthiness. I 
also find that the negative effect is more significant for firms that are more 
financially constrained and firms that rely more on external capital. Furthermore, the 
effect is more severe during the financial crisis period since financial crisis is 
considered as an external supply shock to the reference firms. The above results are 
still significant after considering the endogeneity problem.
My thesis contributes to the literature in the following ways. Despite many 
studies on the determinants of investment and on the CDS market, my research, to 
my knowledge, is the first to examine the effect of CDS trading on corporate 
investment policy which is an important decision related to the financial conditions 
and the future growth of the reference firms. Therefore,, my thesis contributes not 
only to the growing literature on the relationship between CDS trading and reference 
firms, but also to the literature on the factors on investment decisions in imperfect 
capital markets and during financial crisis. Future work could be done by exploring
4
the related underinvestment problem in agency problem theory and investment
efficiency in the traditional investment point of view.
This research has significant implication for corporate mangers to make 
investment decisions when firms have CDS actively traded in the CDS market. It 
provides inputs for regulators about the policy design on optimal utilization of capital 
from the corporate investment point of view after the introduction of CDS market. It 
also gives insights into the review of the regulations on naked credit default swaps 
and the central clearing of the CDS market.
The remainder of my thesis is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 describes the hypotheses development, sample data and methodology of 
the study. Section 4 shows the results and the discussion of research findings. Section 
5 gives the conclusion of the research. Lastly, Section 6 presents the limitations and 
the possible future developments of the research.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
My research is related to four strands of literature: the theory of investment 
decisions, the theory of CDS and information asymmetry, the theory of CDS and 
creditor-debtor relationship and the theory of CDS and corporate liquidity. Each is 
discussed below.
2.1 Determinants of investment
There are abundant and profound studies on the determinants of investment — 
the most commonly studied determinants are external financing, internal financing, 
growth opportunities, external shocks and financial constraints.
Much of the literature demonstrates the existence of relationships among 
external financing, internal financing and investment, while only a few of them 
illustrate explicitly how financing and investment are related. To answer the two 
questions on whether the distribution of external capital is optimized among 
corporations and whether the allocation of internal funding is optimized in the 
corporation, Stein (2003) tests the problems from both theoretical and empirical 
perspectives. He finds that the common source for these two kinds of 
capital-allocation problems is the tradeoff between managers and the capital market. 
In the case of this research, the management teams of the reference entities play an 
important role when deciding CDS firms5 financing channel and investment policy.
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To distinguish the effect of different capital allocations, many researchers study
the two sources, external and internal, separately. Aivazian, Ge and Qiu (2005) test 
the relationship between leverage and investment using Canadian publicly traded 
firms from 1982 to 1999. They find evidence that leverage and investment are 
inversely related. The effect is more significant for firms with low growth 
opportunities. To control for endogeneity problems, they use instrumental variable 
approaches and find similar results. Firth, Lin and Wong (2008) explore the 
relation between leverage and investment among listed firms in China. Using the 
data of 1991 to 2004, they conclude there is a negative relationship between leverage 
and investment. The effect is stronger for high-growth opportunity firms and for 
non-state-owned firms. Accordingly, an increase in leverage negatively affects 
investment. The extent of impact is closely related to other firm characteristics, 
such as growth opportunities, etc.
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) emphasize the importance of internal 
financing for liquidity management for firms with constrained external financing. 
When external financing is constrained, internal financing becomes more important 
in investment decisions. Rauh (2006) empirically measured the relationship between 
change of internal financing supply and levels of investment. He discovered a strong 
significant decline in investment after the reduction of internal financing supply,
7
particularly for financially-constrained firms.
Besides internal financing supply, researchers also study the effect of external 
supply shocks, especially focusing on the financial crisis as cause of an exogenous 
decline of external capital supply. Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010) investigate the 
change in corporate investment caused by the supply shock during the financial crisis, 
called the bank lending supply shock theory. They exhibit that the supply shocks 
before and during the crisis bring about severe investment reductions and the effect is 
especially evidenced when the firms have low cash reserves or high net short-term 
debt, are financially-constrained, or are in an industry which depends heavily on 
external financing. By using the difference-in-difference method, they demonstrate 
again the relationship among financial supply, cash reserve, cash flow, growth 
opportunity, debt levels, financial constraint levels and investment.
With the development of the bank lending supply shock theory, Kahle and Stulz 
(2013) find that the decrease of investment is not fully caused by the large deduction 
of bank credit supply. On the contrary, bank-dependent firms are able to maintain 
more cash compared to unlevered firms.
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) point out because of limited access to 
external capital markets, firms are constrained to investment using internal funding, 
alternatively, the investment of these firms have larger investment-cash flow
8
sensitivity. In contrast, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) have different results. They find
that the least financially-constrained firms primarily use internal cash to invest, but 
they do not identify the reasons. In support of Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary 
(1999) finds similar results — firms’ financial characteristics do affect investment 
policy. The investment of firms with high creditworthiness is more sensitive to the 
amount of internal funds. The theory of financial constraints points to two directions 
in the literature. Moyen (2004) proposes two models originated by Fazzari, Hubbard 
and Petersen (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales • (1997), respectively. 
Financially-constrained firms due to dividends show consistent results with Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1988); financially-constrained firms without external 
financing show consistent results with Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Whited and Wu 
(2006) construct a new finance constraint index using Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM). Unlike the index using by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), the index 
of Whited and Wu (2006) is consistent in representing the external finance 
constraints characteristics.
Corporate governance of the firm is one of the important determinants of 
investment policy. Chava and Roberts (2008) identify the specific channel of 
financing frictions affecting corporate investment. They show that when the firm is 
informationally opaque and has more agency problems, the effect of financing on
9
investment is stronger. Thus, the investment of CDS reference entities with more
information asymmetry and more agency problems may be affected more 
significantly. Biddle, Hilary and Verdi (2009) show the reduction of information , 
asymmetry represented by financial reporting quality increases investment efficiency, 
which means lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. Despite the view of Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Biddle, Hilary and Verdi (2009) show the increase in 
investment-cash flow sensitivity not only reduces over-investment, but also increases 
under-investment.
All in all, there is an extensive literature on investment determinants, most of 
which focus on external financing, internal financing points, and exogenous supply 
shock. The effect of these channels differs according to different financial constraint 
levels and corporate governance levels. CDS trading affects reference firms5 external 
financing and internal financing, and provides different levels of supply shock 
compared with non-CDS trading firms. The effects differ with financial constraint 
levels and corporate governance levels. CDS trading affects reference firms5 external 
financing and internal financing, and provides different levels of supply shock 
compared with non-CDS trading firms. The effects differs with financial constraint 
levels and corporate governance levels.
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2.2 Theory of CDS and information asymmetry
A stream of literature provides evidence that CDS markets will reveal more 
information of the reference firms. Acharya and Johnson (2007) quantify the insider 
trading in the credit derivatives markets compared with publicly trading in stock 
markets from January 2001 to October 2004. They find significant incremental 
information anticipation in the CDS market compared with the stock market. The 
information flow occurs especially for bad credit news and negative shocks, and it is 
more significant for firms related to banks.
Another stream of literature related to CDS and information asymmetry 
demonstrates that CDS trading has effect on the bond market; and the strength of the 
effect is related to firm information transparency. Unlike Acharya and Johnson 
(2007), Ashcraft and Santos (2009) empirically test the impact of CDS trading on 
corporate bonds and syndicated loan markets. They find a small reduction in 
borrowing cost for relatively safer and informationally-transparent firms, no 
reduction for average firms and large increases for risky and informationally-opaque 
firms.
The third stream of literature demonstrates CDS transactions affect the way 
investors use financial information. Griffin (2014) gives an insight on the CDS 
market pricing and functioning in order to give new understanding to investors’ use
l i
of accounting information. He demonstrates the appearance and development of
CDS markets help investors and scholars to understand more about firms beyond the 
traditional information study in the stock and bond markets. Also, the study of credit 
investor behaviors may generate newer theories about more complete and accurate 
market signals in the CDS market. He argues that accounting information has some 
new functions when combined with CDS market analysis. Griffin (2014) provides a 
new perspective and a more integrated summary of the function of CDS markets in 
information transparency and information analysis.
2.3 Theory of CDS and the creditor-debtor relationship
In the recent literature on the effect of CDS transactions, the risk shifting 
between creditors and their CDS counterparties gives rise to the change of 
creditor-debtor relationships. Hu and Black (2008a, 2008b) first raised the problem 
of “empty creditors”. They compare the legal rights and risk exposure of empty 
creditors and other creditors, and find that empty creditors have gained the protection 
when credit events occur. Roberts and Sufi (2009) examine the effect of incentive 
conflicts between firms and their creditors on corporate debt policy. They find solid 
evidence that the effect of creditor actions on debt policy is stronger when the 
debtors’ alternative financing sources are more costly. Nini, Smith and Sufi (2009) 
use a sample of contract terms in private credit agreements between banks and public
12
firms to find a large portion of capital expenditure restriction in the contracts. The
restrictions cause a decline in investment, and increases in market value and 
operating performance.
The theory of Hu and Black (2008a, 2008b) is systematically organized, 
developed and modeled by Bolton and Oehmke (2011). Bolton and Oehmke (2011) 
use the theoretical model to illustrate the effect of CDS introductions on reference 
entities both before and after the 2008 financial crisis. When the borrowers are far 
from financial distress, CDSs can enhance the bargaining power of creditors, offer 
creditors protections against credit risk and give the borrowers capital supply. In 
contrast, when borrowers are close to financial distress or suffering credit events, the 
hedging function of CDS markets may form an over-insurance phenomenon. The 
over-protected creditors have incentives to push the distressed borrowers into 
inefficient bankruptcy. The phenomenon is especially severe when more creditors 
purchase the individual debt.
On the basis of Bolton and Oehmke (2011), Peristiani and Savino (2011) 
empirically estimate the probability of default for non-financial companies in the 
United States during the period of 2001 to 2008. Using the proportional hazard 
model of bankruptcy and Merton’s contingent claims method, they did not find 
significant evidence of the relationship between CDS introduction and default
13
probability. However, they demonstrate that the default frequency o f CDS firms is
higher than non-CDS firms during the last four-year period before and during the 
2008 financial tsunami. Going deeper, they find a positive relationship for CDS 
reference entities between institutional ownership exposure and the level of financial 
distress, especially during the financial crisis.
Different from Peristiani and Savino (2011), Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang 
(2014) investigate the credit quality deterioration with the introduction of CDS 
trading using a more comprehensive sample, with more countries and a longer time 
period covering the three stages of financial crisis — before, during and after. Instead 
of calculating the probability of default using proportional hazard model, they use 
the probability of credit rating downgrades and bankruptcy as the proxy of increased 
credit risk. With the data of 901 North American firms, they find a positive 
relationship between the likelihood of downgrading or the likelihood of bankruptcy 
and CDS trading after controlling for other determinants of credit risk. The outcome 
is significant even after controlling for the endogeneity problem. Similar to the result 
of previous research, they find the severity of the deterioration is positively related to 
the number of creditors and during the financial crisis. Additionally, they test 
whether CDS contract terms affect the significance of the effect and find CDS 
contracts with “no restructuring” terms are strongly related to the credit risk
14
deterioration.
2.4 Theory of CDS and the liquidity management
Taking into consideration CDS trading and leverage, Saretto and Tookes (2013) 
use the sample of all non-financial firms in S&P 500 index during the period 2002 to 
2010. They find CDS trading increases the debt of the reference firms in two 
aspects — the amount of leverage ratio and the length of maturity. Shan, Tang and 
Yan (2014) get similar results using an extensive sample which contains 921 U.S. 
CDS reference firms from June 1997 to April 2009. They find that banks that 
actively use CDS as hedging tools are more likely to lend more in the debt and loan 
market before the crisis. During the crisis, these banks reduced lending more 
compared with other banks.
From the corporate management decision making point of view, Denis and 
Sibilkov (2010) emphasize the importance of cash holdings. They argue that the cash 
holdings of financially-constrained firms are relatively more valuable than 
unconstrained firms. Also, cash holdings are positively related to investment. 
However, some financially-constrained firms may hold too little cash because of 
limited cash flow. With respect to CDS trading, Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang 
(2013) demonstrate the empty creditor problem and further test the corporate cash 
holding policies following the introductions of CDSs and the worsening of credit
15
risks using a similar sample of firms. Their findings show that the introduction of
CDSs influence the future access of external capital financing and, as a consequence, 
increase the precautionary cash holdings. The effect of CDSs on the reference 
entities is significantly related to the trading characteristics in the corresponding 
CDS market. Their findings are closely linked to and further explore the conclusion 
of Bolton and Oehmke (2011) that financially distressed firms and firms with less 
access to financial markets are more affected by CDS introductions.
The trading of CDSs increases leverage ratios, cash ratios and liquidity demand 
of the reference firms. However, the literature does not address the overall effect of 
CDSs on investment decisions. My study finds that CDS trading decreases 
investment for average firms, and the effect is different for firms with different 
financial characteristics and during the financial crisis period.
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CHAPTER 3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT, SAMPLE DATA,
AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Hypotheses development
In general, the literature suggests several directions for further investigation on 
investment and CDS trading.
3.1.1 Hypothesis 1: CDS trading and investment policy
CDS markets provide creditors with protections from credit risk in the event of 
default. The protection works through the risk-shifting regime between creditors and 
debtors because CDS contracts separate the legal right and cash flow right among 
different counterparties in CDS market. Creditors are more willing to lend to CDS 
reference firms, at the same time the creditors become empty creditors for financially 
distressed firms. The empty creditor problem increases the credit risk of the CDS 
reference entities, reveals more information about CDS reference firms, and changes 
the external financing source and internal financing demand. On the whole, because 
of the overall deteriorating of credit ratings, even though the creditors increase credit 
supply, managers tend to make more precautionary investment decisions and invest 
less. Also, from the agency point of view, the information revealed by CDS 
transactions reduce the adverse selection problem in bond market, equity market and 
credit market. In the bond market, informationally- transparent firms increase
17
leverage ratios and extend the debt maturity. Facing this circumstance, managers
tend to make more conservative investment decisions.
HI: The investment of the reference firms decreases when the firm becomes an 
actively-traded CDS reference entity.
Investmentiit
= p0 + piCDS trading i t_! + p2^ as^i,t-i + ftST  Debtijt_!
+ pALT Debtix_! + p5Tobin'sQi r t + P6Ageiit 
+ p-ySizei't+pzLosSi't-i 4- p9Zscoreiit + + Yi,t + eiit (1)
Investment is the ratio of net investment as a portion of total assets, in which net
investment is capital expenditure less the sum of depreciation and amortization,
following Aivazian, Ge and Qiu (2005) and Firth, Lin, and Wong, (2008). As in
Ashcraft and Santos (2009), Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2013), and
Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2014), CDStrading is a dummy variable equals to
one if the firm becomes a reference entity in the CDS market at time (t-1). Age of the
firm stands for the difference between date t and the date when the firm first entered
into the COMPUSTAT database. Size of the firm is calculated as the logarithm value
of total assets. The variables are designed that the minimum value for firm Size and
Age are both positive. Tobin’s Q is the adjusted Tobin’s Q, which is the market value
of assets divided by the sum of 0.9 times the book value of assets and 0.1 times the
market value of assets according to Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) and Duchin,
Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010). Short Term Debt is the ratio of debt in current liabilities
divided by total assets, while Long-Term Debt is the ratio of long-term debt divided
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by total assets. Separate leverage ratios are used in the model because different
maturities of debt have different impacts on investment. If the net income before 
extraordinary items is less than zero, the Loss variable equals one. More specific 
variable explanations and related references are listed in Appendices A and B. All 
firms are classified by the United States Standard Industry Classification (SIC) Code 
listed in Appendix C.
3.1.2 Hypothesis 2: Effect of financial constraint
Firms with more external financial constraints and higher levels of external
financing dependence are more affected by the deterioration of credit risk and credit 
supply change. Managers in these firms tend to be more conservative. Moreover, 
financially-constrained firms or firms in an industry dependent upon external
financing will suffer more after the introduction of CDS transactions.
H2: The effect of CDS introduction on investment will be stronger if the reference 
firms
a) face financial constraints;
b) rely more on externalfinancing;
c) rely more on external equity;
To test hypothesis 2, the research follows a difference-in-difference approach, in 
which I compare the investment of reference entities between CDS firms and 
non-CDS firms as a function of their financial conditions — credit risks, profitability,
liquidity, internal financing source and external financing source. The regressions
also control for industry fixed effects and time fixed effects.
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The common proxies for credit risk are (i) Whited-Wu 2006 index (WW2006
INDEX) defined in the literature in Whited and Wu (2006); (ii) payout ratio {Payout). 
At the same time, I construct external-finance dependence (EFD) as the two-digit 
industry median proportion of investment not financed by cash flow from operations 
(Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy, 2010). Equity dependence (EED) is measured as the 
three-digit industry median ratio of equity to investment (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). 
The detailed explanations of the variables are shown in appendix B.
Higher Whited-Wu 2006 index value imply the more financially-constrained the 
firm is. Firms decrease payout when they are in financial distress. Also, firms with an 
external-finance dependence value higher than the 2-digit industry median EFD 
value, and firms with an external-equity dependence value higher than the 2-digit 
industry median EED level are considered to rely more on external financing or 
external equity, respectively. Firms with higher EFD and EED values will be affected 
more by CDS trading.
3.1.3 Hypothesis 3: Effect of financial crisis
The literature suggests investment is more sensitive to debt and cash flow in the 
financial crisis period. Shen, Tang and Yan (2014) prove that banks with active CDS 
trading tend to be more conservative and reduce more lending than other banks in 
financial crisis period. In many studies, the financial crisis is also used as an
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exogenous supply shock to firms. In consequence, the negative effect is stronger
during the financial crisis period.
H3: The effect o f CDS introduction on investment is stronger for the financial 
crisis period.
Investm ent^
= /3o + P iC D S trad in g ^ -!  + 0 2 C risist- i  + P 3CDS * C R/S/S^-j
+ /34Cashj,t- 1 + /JsST Debt^-j. + f36LT Debti,t_i + f3iTobin'sQ;,t-i + /J8Age;,t 
+ /39Sizei t+f31Q Lossit-! + f311Zscore£,t + f3l2 Cash Flow^t + f313 Tangibility;^
+ +£i,t (3)
In this part, Crisist- X is a dummy variable equals one if the time is during 
2009ql to 2012q2, CDSCR/S/S;,t-i is the interaction term between CDStrading and 
Crisis.
3.2 Data sources and sample selection
The original dataset contains all listed companies in the U.S. with or without 
CDS trading. Recent studies have explored a wide range of CDS databases. The CDS 
reference firms’ data are obtained from Thomson Reuters Eikon (TRE). Data on 
firms’ financial statements are collected from COMPUSTAT dataset.
TRE has data on 14,709 single-name CDS instr^ients with the tenor of 5 year 
in the United States from the first quarter of 2002 to the last quarter of 2014. After 
merging with COMPUSTAT data, I exclude the financial institutions.6 The final 
sample contains 646 CDS reference entities and 9438 non-CDS companies for the
Firms with an SIC code between 6000 to 6999 are excluded. See detailed information in Appendix C.
6
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52-quarter period. The summary of CDS and non-CDS firms for the sample is in
Table 2. The CDS reference entities are listed in Appendix D. Finally, I winsorize all 
the variables at 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the bias caused by outliers except 
for age and Tobin’s Q. For Tobin’s Q, I follow Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) and 
Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010); I computed the scaled Tobin’s Q because the 
winsorized Tobin’s Q is more than 10.
3.3 Methodology
The financial characteristic variables explaining the growth opportunity level, 
debt level, liquidity level, profitability level, financial constraint level and external 
dependence level are used in determining investment. However, other determinants 
of investment may not be included in the model. Hence, I expect there may be an 
omitted variable bias. At the same time, there may be large variability among 
different firms and the coefficients are probably biased.
To deal with these biases, I construct the fixed effect model to get the 
time-varying and firm-varying effect for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 following the main 
literature on investment and main literature on CDS.
Credit default swaps, among other financial products, determine investment 
policy of the reference entity through external financing channel, external equity 
channel and internal financing channel. In consequence, the financial characteristics
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of the firm determining the investment of the firm may not be independent of the
variables determining the probability of the firm having CDS trading. There may be 
a sample selection bias. Therefore, the major concern of using the fixed-effect 
models in this study is endogeneity problem. To solve this problem, I use the 
Two-Stage-Least-Squares method (Wooldridge 2002) and Propensity Score 
Matching method (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) and control for firm financial 
characteristic ratios.
Other researches use two-step model to deal with this issue in the CDS related 
research. In the first step, the probability of being a CDS reference entity is estimated. 
In the second step, I use the predicted results of step one to estimate the probability 
of having CDS trading, and use the estimated probability to test the determining 
effect of investment controlling for other financial characteristics of the firm.
In the PSM method, I use propensity score matching sample to obtain a control 
group and test the results to deal with the endogeneity problem following 
Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2013) and Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2014). 
In this section, I use an one-to-one matching sample at 10%, 5% and 1% separately 
to re-estimate the models. Finally, I test the robustness of the results using other 
corporate spending proxies using fixed effect models.
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CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
This chapter discusses the descriptive statistics, the effect of CDS introductions 
on investment of reference entities and robust tests results.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 lists the investment ratios of the sample firms for the baseline model by 
year. From 2002 to 2014, the number of CDS firms increases at first, then decreases 
after it reaches the peak in 2007. While the number of non-CDS firms declines from 
2002 to 2014. In total, CDS firms have a higher investment ratio than non-CDS firms. 
Also, the investment ratio reduces a lot during the financial crisis period.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Summary statistics are provided in Table 3 for the whole sample from 2002 to 
2014. Overall, the sample contains at least 218,222 observations for all the variables 
in the baseline model. The average investment is 1.71% of total assets, while the 
median value of the investment ratio is only 0.36%. The average value of Tobin’s Q 
is 2.33 and average cash reserve is 23.01% of total assets.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Table 4 presents the results of parametric and non-parametric tests in which I 
compare the two sample groups of CDS firms and non-CDS firms. It shows that 
inherently, CDS firms have a 0.32% higher average investment ratio and 0.63%
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higher median investment ratio compared with non-CDS firms. The t-values and
z-values of most variables are significant at the 1% level. Overall, the results of the 
parametric tests show that CDS firms are larger, have more long-term debt, and have 
a higher Tobin’s Q, which is consistent with the empirical results by Saretto and 
Tookes (2013) and Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2013). It can be concluded that, 
CDS firms as a whole are, on average, senior, larger, and more profitable firms with 
more access to capital.
[Insert Table 4 here]
4.2 Results of fixed effect models
To investigate the impact of CDS trading on investment of reference entities, I 
conduct the fixed effect regressions. Results of empirical tests are below.
4.2.1 Results of Hypothesis 1
I present the results of Hypothesis 1 in Table 5. In the table, there are five 
models: Model (1) is only controlled for size and age; Model (2) is combined with 
the growth opportunity proxy — Tobin’s Q; Model (3) includes the leverage ratio 
and cash reserve ratio, which are the external and internal financing resources; 
Model (4) further includes the profitability level; and Model (5) includes credit risk 
proxy— Altman’s Z-score.
The effect of CDS trading on corporate investment policy is captured by the
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CDS trading variable. Estimated coefficients o f CDS trading are all negatively
related to investment and significant at the 1% in all of the 5 models. The 
coefficients on CDS trading range from -0.2%. In terms of economic significance, 
one quarter after a firm has active CDS trading, the investment ratio decreases by 
0.2%. For a CDS firm which has a total asset of $100 million, the investment 
decreases from $1.71 million to $1,51 million after trading in the CDS market for 
one quarter. The investment decreases by $0.2 million which is a fall of 11.70%. Size 
is positively related to investment while age is negatively related to investment, an 
outcome supporting the literature. In accordance with Aivazian, Ge, and Qiu (2005), 
leverage ratios are negatively correlated to investment. Cash reserve, which 
represents the precautionary liquidity demand, has a similar relationship with 
leverage in accordance with Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010), All of the above 
variables are significant at the 1% significance level. The results support the baseline 
specification that investment decreases with the trading of CDS.
[Insert Table 5 here]
4.2.2 Results of Hypothesis 2
Prior literature suggests that when financing is not frictionless, investment is 
constrained by the access to capital markets, internal financing sources and the firm’s 
financial constraint levels.
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Table 6 shows that the relation between CDS trading and investment is stronger
for firms that are financially constrained. Higher Whited and Wu index levels 
(WW2006 INDEX) and lower payout ratios (Payout) are associated with a higher 
probability to suffer financial distress. The coefficient for WW2006 INDEX is 
Statistically significant at the 1% level. Firms with a WW2006 INDEX higher than 
the two-digit industry median, the CDS trading decreases 1.4% of the investment 
ratio in the new quarter. In contrast, firms that are financially unconstrained (have a 
WW2006 INDEX lower than the two-digit industry median), the trading of CDSs do 
not have a significant effect on investment. Meanwhile, low payout firms have a -0.5% 
decrease on investment, while the impact of high payout firms is not significant. The 
coefficients of all other variables support the literature.
Overall, Table 6 shows significant evidence on the relationship between CDS 
trading and investment decisions while controlling for the differences in financial 
constraints. The reduction of the CDS trading effect on investment is stronger and far 
more negative for financially-constrained firms.
[Insert Table 6 here]
In Table 7, I use the external finance dependence and external equity 
dependence levels to compare the effect between different samples. Following Raj an 
and Zingales (1998), I calculated the quarterly external finance dependence and
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external equity dependence index for each firm. Then the industry median is
calculated by the two-digit SIC industry median value of the specific year. These 
ratios are different from the financial constraint ratios in Table 6, because these 
indices are determined by the industry and exogenous to an individual firm. Table 7 
shows that the introduction of CDS trading significantly decreases investment levels 
for firms that largely depend on external financing and external equity. There is no 
significant evidence for firms depend less on external financing and external equity.
[Insert Table 7 here]
The results of both Table 6 and Table 7 support Hypothesis 3, but there are still 
further concerns and problems to be tested. I will use the instrumental variable 
method to verify the results in order to eliminate the endogeneity problem.
4.2.3 Results of Hypothesis 3
Table 8 shows evidence that during the financial crisis period, CDS trading 
reduces the investment ratio more than in the non-crisis period. Model (1) in the 
table shows the results that, for average firms, investment is negatively associated 
with CDS trading in and after the financial crisis. At the same time, if the firm is not 
financially constrained, the incremental negative effect of CDS trading to investment 
during the financial crisis is not significant. While for firms highly dependent on the 
supply of external financing, the financial crisis had a huge incremental effect on the 
relationship between CDS trading and investment. For firms less dependent on
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external financing, the financial crisis did not increase the impact of CDS trading on
investment.
[Insert Table 8 here]
4.3 Results of models controlling for endogeneity problem
4.3.1 Two-Stage Least Squares method
To solve the endogeneity problem, I adopt the instrumental variable in a 
Two-Stage Least Squares model and the Propensity Score Matching method. I use 
Size, Tangibility, Leverage, Re^m  on Assets (ROA) and Net Working Capital to 
capture the firm characteristics, together with other financial statement variables. In 
the model of table 9, the coefficients of variables are significantly consistent with the 
literature. CDS firms are associated with larger size and larger leverage, larger sales, 
more cash flow and more dividend distribution.
[Insert Table 9 here]
Table 10 report the empirical results using instrumental variables. The results 
are consistent with the original baseline model using CDS trading as independent 
variable. The new results show a negative impact of CDS trading and investment, 
consistent and robust for all of the models. The estimated coefficients for CDS 
trading is -0.6% in the baseline model, -0.7% in the model of high Whited and Wu 
index firms, -0.6% in the model of low payout firms, -0.8% in the model of high
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external financing dependence firms and -0.7% in the model of high external equity
dependence firms, respectively. All of the estimates are statistically significant at the 
1% level. CDS trading has a negative impact on investment after controlling for the 
endogeneity problem. The effect is also significant for subsample tests.
[Insert Table 10 here]
4.3.2 Propensity Score Matching method
In this part, I use the probability of CDS trading estimated in Table 10 to 
estimate the impact of CDS trading on investment. Then I estimate the propensity 
score to get a nearest matching sample and run the regression by each subsample. In 
Table 11, the matching samples of the three Models are the one-to-one matching with 
a nearest propensity score within a 10%, 5% and 1% difference level separately.
The coefficients for CDS trading in all of the models are negative and 
significant. PSM provides evidence that the CDS trading decreases the investment 
ratio. On average, for a CDS firm compared with the matching non-CDS firms with 
similar financial characteristics, the decrease of investment ranges from -0.09% to 
5.3% the samples. The results suggest that the more exact the propensity score 
matching, the more negative the effects are. All of the control variables are consistent 
with the previous tests. It implies that for firms with similar financial characteristics, 
which means firms have similar financial constraint levels, the increase of debt does
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not increase the risk level, and decrease investment. On the contrary, firms with
abundant financing source actively use debt or loan to invest.
[Insert Table 11 here]
4.4 Robustness tests: Alternative investment proxies
Table 12 compares the impact of CDS trading on other corporate spending -­
capital expenditure, acquisitions and inventory. A firm decreases capital expenditure, 
acquisition ratio but increases the level of inventory the next quarter of actively CDS 
trading. The results are consistent with the expected hypotheses. They also support 
the results of Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2013) and Subrahmanyam, Tang and 
Wang (2014): firms suffer more from credit risk, become more conservative and 
pay more attention to precautionary liquidity management after the introduction of 
CDS trading. A subsample of balanced panel data for the fiscal years from the first 
quarter of 2002 through the fourth quarter of 2014 is examined in Table 12. The 
results are consistent with the previous findings.
[Insert Table 12 here]
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION
My study explores the impact of credit default swaps trading on corporate 
investment policy. The research fills the gap of the literature on the relationship 
between CDS and firm investment policy. By employing empirical models using all 
listed U.S. non-financial firms from January 2002 to December 2014, I find 
significant evidence that CDS trading decreases the investment of CDS reference 
entities. Furthermore, the impact is more severe for financially-constrained firms and 
firms which depend more on external source of financing. The results further show 
that the negative relationship comes from the creditor-debtor relationship, 
information asymmetry levels and agency problems. In addition, robustness tests 
show the results are consistent for more than one investment proxy, and with samples 
that are more comparable.
The results are consistent with the findings of Saretto and Tookes (2013), 
Subr^ahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2013) and Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2014) 
that CDS trading increases the credit risk of the reference entity. Firms tend to pay 
more attention to liquidity when the firm becomes a CDS firm. Future work could be 
conducted on the scope of investment efficiency, the agency problem of 
underinvestment, etc.
My research contributes not only to the traditional literature in investment, but
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also contributes to the growing literature on the impact of CDS trading on the
reference entity. It is the first study to give solid evidence of the relationship between 
CDS trading and corporate investment policy.
The findings based on this research give insight to corporate policy makers on 
investment decision making. It also provides regulators with some insights on naked 
CDS trading and central clearing of CDS markets.
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Tables
Table 1: Gross notional amount and net notional amount of top 20 U.S. 
single-name reference entities
The table lists the gross notional amount and net notional amount and the number of executed 
contracts for the Top 20 single-name CDS reference entities in the U.S., excluding financial firms.
Reference Entity Gross Notional m sD  EQ)
Net Notional 
m sD  EQl Contracts
CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT 
OPERATING COMPANY, INC. 26,910,656,539 1,687,293,085 6,836
RADIOSHACK CORPORATION 23,573,806,350 567,002,698 5,342
ALCOA INC. 19,526,516,152 l, 153,570,445 2,436
J. C. PENNEY COMPANY, INC. 19,393,125,704 1,043,520,986 4,743
COMPUTER SCIENCES CORPORATION 17,713,303,315 1,184,331,787 2,232
TRANSOCEAN INC. 17,255,109,656 1,491,282,444 3,050
INTERNATIONAL LEASE FINANCE 
CORPORATION 16,907,075,706 1,172,897,727 2,683
R.R. DONNELLEY & SONS COMPANY 16,309,048,518 665,917,212 2,125
IHEARTCOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 16,295,020,423 980,960,688 4,481
NINE WEST HOLDINGS, INC. 16,128,852,108 562,067,996 3,258
LENNAR CORPORATION 15,558,994,787 1,112,783,181 2,674
SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 15,375,471,058 1,015,162,773 3,044
MACY'S, INC. 15,365,919,189 970,772,150 1,903
SAFEWAY INC. 14,900,963,714 858,531,780 2,240
FORD MOTOR COMPANY 14,750,416,192 1,573,104,013 1,889
ANADARKO PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION 14,728,380,960 1,148,989,897 1,758
GANNETT CO., INC. 14,602,018,333 534,330,026 2,472
AT&T INC. 14,506,119,056 1,511,954,423 1,657
L BRANDS, INC. 14,009,794,598 850,874,818 2,446
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION 13,899,704,339 1,000,097,088 2,160
Source: DTCC Trade Information Warehouse, Section: Open Positions Data, Table 6  Gross and Net 
Notional Top 1000 Reference entities, week ending 2014-12-26
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This table provides investment ratios of sample frrrns by year. The variables are defined as follows. 
Number o f  CDS firms and Number o f Non-CDS firms are the numbers of CDS firms and non-CDS 
firms per year, respectively. CDS firms Investment Ratio is the average investment ratio for ail CDS 
firms at year t, Non-CDS firms investment Ratio is the corresponding average investment ratio for all 
non-CDS firms at year t.
T a b le  2: In ve stm e n t ra tios o f  sam p le firm s b y  y e a r
Year
Number of 
CDS firms
Number of 
Non-CDS firms
CDS firms 
Investment Ratio
Non-CDS firms 
Investment Ratio
2 0 0 2 267 6446 0.0206 0.0116
2003 350 6008 0.0191 0 . 0 1 1 2
2004 439 5571 0.0187 0.0161
2005 472 5394 0 . 0 2 0 0 0.0193
2006 467 5137 0.0232 0.0216
2007 484 4928 0.0240 0.0217
2008 464 4674 0.0234 0.0216
2009 432 4521 0.0142 0.0115
2 0 1 0 414 4470 0.0139 0.0140
......  2 0 1 1 378 4403 0.0192 0.0188
2 0 1 2 369 4465 0.0227 0.0198
2013 349 4270 0 .0 2 0 1 0.0179
2014 341 3934 0 . 0 2 0 1 0.0158
Total 646 9438 0 . 0 2 0 0 0.0168
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T a b le  3: D e scrip tiv e  statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics of the key variables for the U.S. listed companies with or 
without CDS trading, and not in the financial industry (SIC code 6000-6999). The variables are 
defined as follows. Investm ent is the amount o f capital expenditures minus depreciation and 
amortization, divided by total assets. S ize  is the natural logarithm o f total assets. A ge  is the natural 
logari^m of total quarters since the first time the firm was included in COMPUSTAT. T obin ’s  Q  is 
the scaled Tobin’s Q, which is the market value of assets (total assets + market value of common 
equity - total common equity - deferred taxes)/(0.9 * total assets + 0.1 * market value of assets). Cash  
is the ratio of cash and short term investment divided by total assets. S hort term  debt is the ratio of 
debt in current liabilities divided by total assets, and lon g  term deb t is the ratio of long term debt to 
total assets. L oss equals one if the firm has a negative net income and zero otherwise. Z -score is a 
measure o fa  company’s financial distress level according to Altman (1968).
Variables N Mean Median Minimum Maximum SD
In ves tm en t 233,180 0.0171 0.0036 -0.0631 0.2719 0.0456
S ize 249,515 4.9586 5.0094 0.6941 10.5609 2.4757
............. A g e 248,717 8.2814 8.3855 4.5218 9.9879 1.0217
T o b in ’s  O 231,399 2.3315 1.5862 0.5416 9.9569 2.0151
C ash 247,467 0.2307 0.1194 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.9963 0.2634 ^
S h o rt T erm  D e b t 241,800 0.2801 0.0091 0 . 0 0 0 0 11.0385 1.3284'
L o n g  T erm  D e b t 245,574 0.2004 0.0751 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.9711 0.3142
Cash F low 234,128 -0.1259 0 . 0 2 0 0 -5.3667 0.1520 0.6658
T angib ility 247,200 0.2360 0.1463 -0 . 1 0 0 0 2.4538 0.2414
L oss 247,991 0.4688 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 0.4990
Z -sco re 218,222 2.1356 1.8823 -6.6339 14.0805 4.8867
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T a b le  4: P a ra m e tric  an d  n o n -p a ra m e tric  an alyses
The table shows the total number of observations, mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation for both CDS firms and non-CDS firms separately (all 
winsorized at the I"  and 99th percentile except for Age). The t-values are calculated by the two-sided t-test of mean equality with unequal variances, while the z-values are 
given by the two-sample Mann-Whitney test for equality of medians. The tests are conducted by non-CDS minus CDS firms. ***, **, * represent the statistics are significant 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Variables Non-CDS companies CDS companies
Two-sample t-test with unequal 
variances 
t-value
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann-Whitney) 
z-value
N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean (N on-CD S)-M ean (CDS) Median (Non-CD S)-M edian (CDS)
In vestm en t 214,535 0.0168 0.0030 18,645 0 . 0 2 0 0 0.0093 -11.8200*** -43.916***
„ S ize 230,105 4.6255 4.7291 19,410 8.9081 8.8953 -470.0000*** -213.445***
A g e 229,307 8.1985 8.2985 19,410 9.2617 9.4700 -2 0 0 .0 0 0 0 *** -147.892***
Cash 228,060 0.2419 0.1297 19,407 0.0992 0.0640 148.7500*** 59.431***
S h o r t T erm  D e b t 222,907 0.3008 0.0083 18,893 0.0363 0.0164 89.4179**** -20.337***
L o n g  T erm  D e b t 226,224 0.1929 0.0491 19,350 0.2878 0.2487 -59.3952**** -103.360***
T o b in ’s  Q 212,627 2.3973 1.6098 18,772 1.5870 1.4434 131.8185*** 31.511***
C ash  F low 215,458 -0.1399 0.0175 18,670 0.0355 0.0342 - 1 2 0 .0 0 0 0 *** -85.342***
T angib ility 227,881 0.2291 0.1372 19,319 0.3177 0.2527 -50.8693*** -67.040***
L oss 228,589 0.4947 0 . 0 0 0 0 19,402 0.1643 0 . 0 0 0 0 115.7039*** 88.572***
Z -sco re 201,319 2.1335 1.8840 16,903 2.1601 1.8740 -42.6112*** 2.083**
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Table 5: The effect of CDS trading on investment
The dependent variable is the level of company investment, which is the value of capital expenditure 
minus depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. The explanations of variables are 
provided in Appendix A and Appendix B. Time and industry dummies are included but not listed 
below. ***, **, * represent the statistics are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Independent Variables
Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
.......... C D S  trad in g -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 2 ***
(-3.011) (-3.160) (-2.906) (-2.808) (-3.659)
Size 0 .0 0 2 *** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(14.738) (25.095) (25.223) (23.841) (22.780)
A g e -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(-13.623) (-15.482) (-14.902) (-14.971) (-14.094)
T o b in ’s  Q 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(32.202) (43.263) (42.052) (41.364)
C ash 0 .0 2 0 *** 0 .0 2 0 *** 0 .0 2 0 ***
(35.102) (34.860) (34.850)
S h o r t T erm  D eb t -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 2 ***
(-23.321) (-23.187) (-18.462)
L o n g  Term  D e b t -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(-12.354) (-11.611) (-10.492)
Cash F low 0 .0 0 2 *** 0 .0 0 2 *** 0 . 0 0 0
(9.969) (8.969) (0.902)
T angib ility 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.064***
(79.611) (80.011) (78.517)
......... L o ss -0.004*** -0.004***
(-20.340) (-20.318)
.............. Z -sco re 0 .0 0 2 ***
(11.584)
C o n sta n t 0.016*** 0.014*** -0 .0 1 0 *** -0.007** -0.008***
(8.170) (5.385) (-3.854) (-2.451) (-3.042)
r ' 0.487 0.495 0.515 0.517 0.515
Adjusted R2 0.466 0.474 0.494 0.496 0.494
Number of observations 232,575 213,751 207,536 207,172 200,424
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES
Q uarter Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES
F-statistic 686.752 675.853 754.901 751.762 714.940
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T a b le  6: T h e  effect o f  C D S  tr a d in g  on in vestm en t fo r  fin a n cia l con strain ed
firms
The dependent variable is the level of company investment, which is the value of capital expenditure 
minus depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. The explanations of variables are 
provided in Appendix A and Appendix B. Time and industry dummies are included but not listed 
below. *•*, **, * represent the statistics are significant at the 1 %, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
^WW2006 IN D E X P a y o u t
In d e p e n d en t V a r ia b les H igh L o w H ig h L o w
(3) (4) (5) (6 )
CDStrading -0.014*** -0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 1 -0.005***
(-3.715) (-1.569) (1.448) (-4.548)
Size 0.005*** 0 .0 0 2 *** 0 .0 0 2 *** 0.004***
(19.270) (9.039) (7.437) (21.547)
Age -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.004***
(-9.759) (-1 2 .0 2 2 ) (-11.328) (-1 1 .0 2 0 )
Tobin’s Q 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.003***__
(29.737) (31.633) (25.464) (32.767) _
Short Term Debt -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 1 2 *** -0 . 0 0 1  *** -0 .0 0 2 ***
(-14.071) (-15.598) (-4.808) (-16.364)
Long Term Debt -0 .0 0 2 *** -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.004***
(-4.895) (-16.330) (-8.638) (-7.877)
Cash 0 . 0 2 1  *** 0 .0 1 2 *** 0.014*** 0 .0 2 2 ***
(28.627) (11.204) (13.606) (31.825)
Cash Flow -0 . 0 0 0 -0.015*** 0 . 0 0 1 -0 . 0 0 0
(-0.362) (-5.668) (1.323) (-0.320)
Tangibility 0.063*** 0.073*** 0.084*** 0.062***
(60.544) (44.173) (43.679) (65.067)
Loss -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(-14.298) (-13.145) (-8.895) (-16.795)
Z-score 0 .0 0 2 *** -0 . 0 0 1 0 .0 0 2 *** 0 .0 0 2 ***
(9.972) (-0.846) (4.930) (10.316)
Constant -0 .0 1 0 *** 0.052*** 0.016*** -0 .0 1 1 ***
(-2.847) (9.934) (2.749) (-3.289)
R ' 0.466 0.659 0.640 0.513
A d ju ste d  R 2 0.426 0.639 0.606 0.484
N u m b e r  o f  o b ser v a tio n s 114,404 8 6 , 0 2 0 57,398 143,026
Firm Fixed Effect Y E S Y E S Y E S Y E S
Q uarter Fixed Effect Y E S Y E S Y E S Y E S
F -sta tist ic 302.308 552.225 307.600 453.517
r.' 56.30 42.77 "
Prob > 1.2 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
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T a b le  7: T h e  e ffe ct o f  C D S  tr a d in g  on in vestm e n t fo r firm s w ith  extern al
finance dependence and external equity dependence
The dependent variable is the level of company investment, which is the value of capital expenditure 
minus depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. The explanations of variables are 
provided in Appendix A and Appendix B. Time and industry dummies are included but not listed 
b eIow. ***, **, * represent the statistics are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
E x tern a l eq u ity  d ep e n d en ce E x tern a l fin a n ce  d ep e n d en ce
In d e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le s H igh L o w H ig h L o w
(!) (2 ) (3) (4)
. CDStrading -0.004*** -0 . 0 0 1 -0.004*** 0 . 0 0 1
(-3.763) ■ (-0.615) (-4.355) (1.172)
Size 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0 .0 0 2 ***
(20.664) (8.492) (20.483) (7.802)
A ge -0.005*** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0.005*** -0 .0 0 2 ***
(-13.845) (-3.428) (-12.041) (-4.027)
Tobin's Q 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(32.151) (31.856) (32.429) (32.197)
Short Term Debt -0 .0 0 2 *** -0.005*** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0.003***
(-14.593) (-12.238) (-15.139) (-5.792)
Long Term Debt -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.003*** -0.009***
(-8.625) (-10.303) (-6.178) (-12.794) ”
Cash 0 .0 2 0 *** 0.016*** 0 .0 2 2 *** 0.005***
(30.719) (12.232) (30.796) (5.399)
Cash Flow 0 .0 0 0 ** -0.008*** 0 . 0 0 0 -0.004***
(2.135) (-8.763) (1.235) (-2.984)
Tangibility 0.058*** 0.083*** 0.065*** 0.041 ***
(60.661) (45.041) (63.387) (28.178)
Loss -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.004***
(-14.583) (-12.393) (-23.831) (-19.394)
Z.score 0 .0 0 2 *** -0.005*** 0 .0 0 2 *** 0.005***
(10.788) (-6.144) (8.840) (6.207)
Constant -0 . 0 0 1 -0.029*** -0.004 -0.016***
(-0.281) (-4.733) (-1.104) (-4.487)
R2 0.515 0.642 0.533 0.665
A d ju ste d  R 2 0.484 0.607 0.502 0.639
N u m b e r  o f  o b ser v a tio n s 136,559 63,865 127,273 73,151
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Q uarter Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES :
____ , _ F -sta tistic 430.621 290.855 431.077 443.465
x' 102.34 125.88 .
| P ro b  >  1.2 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0  _
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T a b le  8: T h e  e ffe ct o f  C D S  tr a d in g  on in vestm e n t d u r in g  fin a n cia l crisis period
The dependent variable is the level of company investment, which is the value of capital expenditure 
minus depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. The explanations o f variables are 
provided in Appendix A and Appendix B. Time and industry dummies are included but not listed 
below. ***, **. * represent the statistics are significant at the lo/co, 5% and lOo/co levels, respectively.
Baseline model
Payout External dependence
Independent Variables High Low High Low
(I) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
______ C D S  trad in g -0 .0 0 2 *** 0 . 0 0 1 -0.003*** -0.004*** 0 . 0 0 1
(-2.962) (1.373) (-3.053) (-3.617) (1.094)
C R IS IS 0.015*** 0.006*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 0 . 0 0 1  .
(19.336) (4.795) (32.994) (32.063) (1.232) ,
C D S C R IS IS -0 .0 0 1 ** 0 . 0 0 0 -0.004*** -0 .0 0 2 ** 0 . 0 0 0
(-2.171) (0.209) (-3.789) (-2.248) (0.168)
S ize 0.004*** 0 .0 0 2 *** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0 .0 0 2 ***
(22.794) (7.436) (21.570) (20.501) (7.800) .
A g e -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0 .0 0 2 ***
(-14.142) (-11.298) (-11.046) (-12.089) (-4.024)
T o b in 's  Q 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(41.377) (25.463) (32.799) (32.435) (32.191)
S h o r t T erm  D e b t -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 1 *** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0.003***
(-18.464) (-4.808) (-16.372) (-15.139) (-5.792)
L o n g  T erm  D e b t -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.009***
(-10.501) (-8.637) (-7.895) (-6.184) (-12.792)
C ash F low 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 -0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 -0.004***
(0.902) (1.323) (-0.321) (1.235) (-2.983) "
T angib ility 0.064*** 0.084*** 0.062*** 0.065*** 0.041 ***
(78.520) (43.678) (65,081) (63.392) (28.178)
C ash 0 .0 2 0 *** 0.014*** 0 .0 2 2 *** 0 .0 2 2 *** 0.005***
(34.865) (13.603) (31.854) (30.821) (5.400)
_________ L oss -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.004***
(-20.314) (-8.894) (-16.768) (-23.811) (-19.392)
Z -sco re 0 .0 0 2 *** 0 .0 0 2 *** 0 .0 0 2 *** 0 .0 0 2 *** 0.005***
(11.592) (4.926) (10.324) (8.847) (6.206)
C on stan t -0.008*** 0.016*** -0 . 0 1 1  *** -0.004 -0.016***
(-3.007) (2.736) (-3.284) (-1.074) (-4.488)
R ' 0.515 0.640 0.513 0.533 0.665
Adjusted R2 0.494 0.606 0.484 0.502 0.639
Number of observations 200,424 57,398 143,026 127,273 73,151
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES
.Quarter Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES
F 703.680 302.713 446.591 424.329 436.420
x' 21.69 57.84
Prob > )(2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
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T a b le  9: P re d ictio n  o f  C D S  referen ce entities
The dependent variable is related to CDS trading. The explanations of variables are provided in 
Appendix A and Appendix B. Time and industry dummies are included but not listed below. ***, **,* 
represent the statistics are significant at the I%, 5% and I 0% levels, respectively.
In d e p e n d en t V a r ia b les P ro b a b ility  o f  C D S  tr a d in g
Size 0.872***
(138.395) ............................
Tangibility 0.340***
(9 .449)..............................................
............ Tobin’s Q -0.023.........................  .
(-1.633) . .......................
Leverage 0.537*** ..........................
(22.084) ........................
Cash -0.609*** ,
(-9.353) . . . . . . . .
_ _Cash Flow 1 9 9 9 ***
(4.247).
....  ROA 0.035
(0.227) ...... ..... ... .......
SALE 0.004*** ........... .. . .... .. _
(2.637)............. ......
Net Working Capital 0.194***
(4.363)
Dividend 0.096*** ..
(8.230)
Z-score 0.050 . . . . . . . . .  ............
(1.209)
Constant -8.478***
(-95.014)
P se u d o  R 2 0.292
N u m b er  o f  o b ser v a tio n s 15,446
F ir m /In d u str y  F ix ed  E ffe c t YES
Q u a r ter  F ix e d  E ffect YES
F -sta tis t ic 2163.64
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Table 10: The effect of CDS trading on investment controlling for endogeneity problem: an Instrumental variable approach—the effect 
of CDS trading on investment
The dependent variable is the investment, which is the value of capital expenditure minus depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. The explanations o f variables 
are provided in Appendix A and Appendix B. Time and industry dummies are included but not listed below. ***, **, * represent the statistics are significant at the I%, 5% 
and 1 0 % levels, respectively.
’ Independent variables
Baseline
model
WW2006INDEX Payout External equity dependence
External finance 
dependence
High Low High Low High____ Low High Low
(I) (3) (4) (5) (6 ) (7) (8 ) (9) ( 1 0 )
In stru m en ted  
C D S  trad in g
-0.006*** -0.007*** 0 . 0 0 0 -0 . 0 0 2 -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.004** -0.008*** -0 . 0 0 2
(-6.962) (-6.057) (0.039) (-1.196) (-6 .1 1 2 ) (-6.957) (-2.087) (-6.733) (-1.008)
S ize 0 . 0 0 1  *** 0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 1 *** 0 .0 0 0 *** 0 .0 0 1 *** 0 .0 0 1 *** 0 .0 0 0 ** 0 .0 0 1 *** 0 .0 0 1 ***
(19.733) (23.353) (-10.317) (3.241) (23.223) (23.300) (2.238) (9.593) (21.664)
A g e -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0 .0 0 1 ***
(-29.868) (-18.460) (-22.621) (-12.571) (-24.484) (-24.970) (-16.766) (-28.358) (-11.007)
T o b in ’s  Q 0 .0 0 2 *** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0 .0 0 2 *** 0.005*** 0 .0 0 2 *** 0.004*** ,
(38.497) (31.243) (38.811) (23.258) (33.935) (32.401) (31.595) (22.414) (41.778)
_ _ S h o r t Term  D eb t -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0.008*** -0 .0 0 0 ** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0.004*** -0 .0 0 1 *** -0.005***
(-19.006) (-14.757) (-15.335) (-2 .0 2 2 ) (-17.882) (-16.741) (-12.124) (-14.243) (-11.780)
L o n g  T erm  D eb t -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0 .0 1 1 *** -0.004*** -0 .0 1 0 ***
(-18.126) (-8.811) (-24.492) (-14.397) (-14.507) (-13.833) (-17.749) (-11.560) (-22.490)
Cash 0 .0 1 2 *** 0 . 0 1 1  *** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.015*** -0 .0 0 1 **
(33.049) (23.505) (6.328) (12.781) (29.102) (29.374) (10.550) (30.321) (-2.133)
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......  C ash F low 0 . 0 0 0 -0 .0 0 1 *** 0.004** 0 .0 0 2 *** -0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 -0 .0 1 0 *** 0 . 0 0 0 0.007***
(0.292) (-3.567) (2.575) (3.768) (-0.672) (1.520) (-14.279) (0.568) (6.813) "
......  T angib ility 0.072*** 0.067*** 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.042***
(161.605) (105.052) (134.914) (104.018) (129.539) (125.365) (102.629) (129.445) (75.751)
L o ss -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.013*** -0.008***
(-40.330) (-26.032) (-24.718) (-17.266) (-36.124) (-30.659) (-24.728) (-45.082) (-33.703) ...
...... _ Z -sco re 0.003*** 0.003*** 0 . 0 0 1 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0 .0 0 1 ** 0.003*** 0.004***__
(18.080) (15.894) (1.631) (9.246) (15.671) (16.017) (2.576) (14.251) (9.326)
C on stan t 0.024*** 0 .0 1 1 *** 0.082*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.027***
(21.523) (7.224) (47.801) (9.520) (16.624) (14.134) (16.321) (22.704) (21.199)
R ' 0.325 0.263 0.457 0.407 0.308 0.298 0.399 0.316 0.455 ....
Adjusted R 2 0.325 0.262 0.457 0.406 0.307 0.298 0.398 0.315 0.455
Number of observations 198,282 112,625 85,657 56,010 142,272 134,999 63,283 125,828 72,454 _
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Y E S___
Q uarter Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
F-statistic 1,381.996 3,066.574 581.179 1,059.158 555.439 915.604 830.159 606.972 840.319
x 33.26 16.19 50.16 308.70
Prob > x2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
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T a b le  1 1 :  T h e  e ffe ct o f  C D S  tr a d in g  on in vestm en t co n tro llin g  fo r  en d ogen eity
problem—Propensity Score Matching method
The dependent variable is the investment, which is the value of capital expenditure minus depreciation 
and amortization divided by total assets. The explanations of variables are provided in Appendix A 
and Appendix B. Time and industry dummies are included but not listed below. ***, **, * represent 
the statistics are significant at the I%, 5% and 10% levels,, respectively.
Independent variables
Investment
Nearest one 
matching 
diff(PS)<l O %
Nearest one 
matching 
diff(PS)<5%
Nearest one 
matching 
diff(PS)<l °%
(!) (2 ) (3)
__  . C D S  tra d in g -0.009*** -0 .0 2 0 *** -0.053*** _
(-4.446) (-6.464) (-5.346) '
S ize 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** '
(21.758) (20.862) (20.363)
A g e -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** _
(-12.236) (-1 2 . 1 2 0 ) (-11.062)
T o b in ’s  Q 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(36.399) (35.088) (31.953)
S h o r t T erm  D eb t -0 .0 0 2 "*** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 2 ***
(-16.786) (-16.274) (-14.987)
L o n g  T erm  D eb t -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(-7.901) (-7.585) (-6.257)
Cash 0 .0 2 0 *** 0 .0 2 0 *** 0 .0 2 0 ***
(32.624) (31.803) (30.362)
C ash F low 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 -0 . 0 0 0
(0.513) (0.386) (-0.213)
T angib ility 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.064***
(72.214) (70.364) (66.083)
L o ss -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***......
(-17.302) (-16.432) (-14.049)
Z -sco re 0 .0 0 2 *** 0 .0 0 2 *** 0 .0 0 2 ***
(10.545) (10.409) (10.181) ”
C o n sta n t -0.009*** -0.007** -0.008**
(-2.834) (-2.240) (-2.429)
R ' 0.488 0.478 0.461
Adjusted R2 0.463 0.452 0.431 "
N um ber of observations 162,455 152,069 130,588 ;
Firm  Fixed Effect YES YES YES .
Q uarter Fixed Effect YES YES YES
F-statistic 507.383 454.181 352.478 ____’
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The first dependent variable is the investment proxy in the baseline model, which is the value of 
capital expenditure minus depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. The second 
investment proxy is the ratio of acquisitions divided by total assets. The third variable is the ratio of 
inventory divided by total assets. The explanations of variables are provided in Appendix A and 
Appendix B. Time and industry dummies are included but not listed below. ***, **, * represent the 
statistics are significant at the 1 %, 5% and 10% levels,, respectively.
T a b le  12 : R o b u stn ess test u s in g  a ltern a tive  in vestm en t p roxies
Independent variables
Capital expenditure Acquisition Inventory
( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 )
C D S  tra d in g -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0.005*** -0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(-2.746) (-2.737) (-6.320) (-3.884) (3.686) (4.244)
S ize 0 .0 0 1 *** 0 .0 0 1 *** 0.009*** 0 .0 1 0 *** -0.014*** -0.017***
(7.583) (3.463) (47.328) (26.672) (-52.804) (-50.822)
A g e -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.005*** 0.004*** 0.006***
(-15.837) (-5.005) (-8.863) (-4.435) (8.414) (6.632)
T ob in 's Q 0.003*** 0.004*** 0 .0 0 1 *** 0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 0 ** -0 .0 0 1 **
(37.280) (24.123) (12.880) (7.542) (-2.273) (-2.305)
S h o r t T erm  D eb t -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 . 0 0 1  *** -0.003*** -0 .0 0 0 *** 0.009***
(-18.956) (-4.939) (-4.501) (-4.930) (-3.038) (16.583)
L o n g  T erm  D eb t -0.004*** -0.009*** 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1
(-10.597) (-12.293) (1.045) (0.555) (0.099) (0.583) .
C ash 0 .0 1 1 *** 0.007*** -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.074*** -0.081***
(20.365) (6.982) (-6.298) (-5.547) (-84.273) (-55.521)
Cash F low -0.003*** -0.003*** 0 .0 0 1 *** 0.006*** -0 .0 0 1 *** -0.017***
(-13.812) (-3.307) (4.241) (3.942) (-3.743) (-13.081)
T angib ility 0.089*** 0.087*** -0.008*** -0.019*** -0.029*** -0.028***
(109.459) (57.166) (-8.043) (-7.447) (-22.884) (-12.442)
L oss -0.003*** -0.003*** -0 .0 0 1 *** -0 .0 0 1 *** 0 .0 0 1 *** 0.003***
(-14.661) (-9.705) (-2.867) (-3.019) (2.787) (7.062)
_____ Z -score 0.003*** 0.003*** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0 .0 1 0 *** 0.006*** 0.019***
(18.731) (4.103) (-10.126) (-9.566) (20.399) (21.016)
C o n sta n t 0.016*** 0.004 -0 .0 1 0 *** -0.008 0.161*** 0.186***
(5.992) (0.635) (-3.091) (-0.826) (37.606) (2 2 .2 2 1 )
R2 0.567 0.633 0.217 0.184 0.876 0.923
Adjusted R2 0.548 0.625 0.183 0.165 0.871 0.922
Number of observations 200,473 66,275 196,929 64,240 198,495 65,374
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Q uarter Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
__  F-statistic 834.427 409.212 123.772 51.365 172.847 113.789
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Appendices
Appendix A: List of investment variables
This appendix lists all the dependent variables used in the econometric model. The database  column 
records the data source of each variable. The explanation  column gives formulas and simple 
explanations of the variables. The nam e column represents the formula of each variable and the 
calcu lation  column represents how they are calculated using the variable code of in the corresponding 
database. The references column offers the related literature of each variable.
Name Database Calculation Explanation References
Investment proxy in baseline specification
Investment Compustat (capxq-dpq)
/atq
(Capital
Expenditures-depreciation and 
amortization)/ Total assets
Aivazian,Ge and 
Qiu(2005), Firth, Lin and 
Wong(2008) etc.
Investment proxies for robustness t e s t s ___________
Capital
expenditure
Compustat capxy/atq Capital expenditures/ Total 
assets
Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy 
(2 0 1 0 )
Acquisition Compustat aqcy/atq Acquisition/ Total assets Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy 
(20 1 0), Subrahmanyam, 
Tang and Wang (2013)
Inventory Compustat invtq/atq Inventory/ Total assets Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy 
(2 0 1 0 )
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Appendix B: List of control variables
This appendix lists all of the control variables in the model. The nam e column represents the names of 
variables used in the model. The explanation  column gives the formula of each variable and the 
calcu lation  column represents how they are calculated using the variable code of in the corresponding 
database. The references column offers the related literature of each variable. The control variables are 
classified into six categories—growth opportunity, profitability, liquidity, leverage, financial 
constraints and external dependence.
Name Calculation Explanation References
Growth Opportunity _____________
Size ln(l+atq) Logarithm value of I plus 
total assets. Total assets are 
in thousands. The size value 
is calculated by the sum o 1' 
I and total assets to keep 
the value positive.
Graham and Harvey (2001); Chava and 
Roberts (2008); Firth, Lin and Wong (2008); 
Robers and Sufi (2009); Duchin, Ozbas, and 
Sensoy (2010); Campello, Graham, and 
Harvey (201 O); Saretto and Tookes (2013); 
Subrahmanyarn, Tang and Wang (2013); 
Ozgiir, Florackis, and Ozkan (2014); : 
Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2014); 
Shan, Tang, and Yan (2014), etc.
Age In(l+age) Logarithm value o f I plus 
age. Age is generated by 
the total quarters available 
in COMPUSTAT for the 
specific firm from the 
quarter 1950ql. The age 
value is calculated by the 
sum of I and quarter 
numbers to keep the value 
positive.
Almeida and Campello (2007), Hovakimian 
(2009), Denis and Sibilkov (2010), Kahle and 
Stulz(20 13);Saretto and Tookes (2013); 
Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2013); 
Ozgiir, Florackis, and Ozkan (2014), etc.
Tobin’s Q (atq+(cshoq
*prccq)-ceq
q)/(0.9*atq+
O.l*(atq+(c
shoq*prccq)
-ceqq-txdbq
))
Market value of assets(total 
assets + market value of 
common equity-total 
common equity-deferred 
taxes)/ (0.9*total assets+ 
0 .1 *market value of assets)
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003); Duchin, 
Ozbas, and Sensoy (20 I O); etc.
Profitability
ROA Ibq/atq Return on assets Chava and Roberts (2008); Nini, Smith, and 
Sufi (2009); Campello, Graham, and Harvey 
(2010); Saretto and Tookes (2013); 
Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2013), 
Shan, Tang, and Yan (2014), etc.
Sales Saleq/atq Sales divided by total assets Chava and Roberts (2008); Nini, Smith, and
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Sufi (2009); Campello, Graham, and Harvey 
(2010); Saretto and Tookes (2013); 
Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2013), 
Ozgilr, Florackis, and Ozkan (2014); Shan, 
Tang, and Yan (2014), etc. .
Loss dummy Loss equals one if the firm 
has a negative net income, 
and zero otherwise.
Graham and Harvey (2001); Chava and 
Roberts (2008); Firth, Lin and Wong (2008); 
Robers and Sufi (2009); Sufi (2009); Duchin, 
Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010); Carnpello, 
Graham, and Harvey (2010); Saretto and 
Tookes (2013); Shan, Tang, and Yan (2014), 
etc.
Liquidity _
Cash cheq/atq The ratio of cash and 
short-term investment 
divided by total assets.
Graham and Harvey (2001); Chava and 
Roberts (2008); Firth, Lin and Wong (2008); 
Robers and Sufi (2009); Duchin, Ozbas, and 
Sensoy (2010); Campello, Graham, and 
Harvey (201O); Saretto and Tookes (2013); 
Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2013); 
ozgilr, Florackis, and Ozkan (2014); 
Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2014); 
Shan, Tang, and Yan (2014), etc. .........
Net
Working
Capital
(Atcq-ltcq-c
heq)/atq
(Current assets- current 
liability-cash)/ total asets
Kaplan and Zingales (1997); Cleary (1999); 
Graham and Harvey (2001); Firth, Lin and 
Wong (2008); Robers and Sufi (2009); 
Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (201O); Saretto 
and Tookes (2013); Subrahmanyam, Tang and 
Wang (2013); Subrahmanyam, Tang and 
Wang (2014); Shan, Tang, and Yan (2014), 
etc.
Leverage
Leverage (Dlcq+dlttq
)/atq
The ratio of total debt to 
total assets.
Graham and Harvey (2001); Chava and 
Roberts (2008); Firth, Lin and Wong (2008); 
Robers and Sufi (2009); Duchin, Ozbas, and 
Sensoy (2010); Carnpello, Graham, and 
Harvey (2010); Saretto and Tookes (2013); 
Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2013); 
Ozgilr, Florackis, and Ozkan (2014); 
Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2014); 
Shan, Tang, and Yan (2014), etc.
Short Term 
Debt
dlcq/atq The ratio of debt in current 
liabilities divided by total 
assets.
Almeida and Campello (2007); Duchin, 
Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010), Carnpello, 
Graham, and Harvey (201O); Saretto and 
Tookes (2013); Subrahmanyam, Tang and 
Wang (2013); Ozgilr, Florackis, and Ozkan
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(2014); Shan, Tang, and Yan (2014), etc.
Long Term 
Debt
dlttq/atq The ratio of long-term debt 
divided by total assets.
Almeida and Campello (2007); Duchin, 
Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010), Campello, 
Graham, and Harvey (2010); Saretto and 
Tookes (2013); Subrahmanyam, Tang and 
Wang (2013); Ozgiir, Florackis, and Ozkan 
(2014); Shan, Tang, and Yan (2014), etc.
Tangibility Ppentq/atq The ratio of tangible assets 
to total assets
Graham and Harvey (2001); Chava and 
Roberts (2008); Firth, Lin and Wong (2008); 
Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010); 
Ozgiir, Florackis, and Ozkan (2014); Shan, 
Tang, and Yan (2014), etc. ........... ..................
..........................  Financial Constraints _
Payout (dvp+dcv+p
rstkc)/ib
Payout is a financial 
constraint proxy, lower 
payout represents higher 
financial constraint. 
Payout=(dividends 
preferred + dividends 
common + Purchase of 
Common and Preferred 
Stock ) / Income Before 
Extraordinary Items
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988); 
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004); 
Hovakimian (2009); Denis and Sibilkov 
(2010); Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010), 
etc.
Dividend Dividend dummy equals 
one ■ if the firm pays 
dividends during the year, 
and zero otherwise.
Almeida and Campello (2007), Hovakimian 
(2009), Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang 
(2013); Ozgiir, Florackis, and Ozkan (2014), 
etc.
Z-score l .2 *(atcq-lt 
cq)/atq+1.4 
*re/atq+3.3 
*ebit/atq+O. 
6 *
[atq+(cshoq 
*prccq)-ceq 
q)]/atq+0.99 
9 *saleq/atq
A measure of company’s 
financial distress level by 
Altman (1968).
Z score= 1 .2 *working 
capital+l .4*retained 
eamings+3.3 *earnings 
before interest and 
taxes+O.6 *market value 
equity/book value of 
debt+0.999*sales/total 
assets
Altman( 1968)
KZ1997
INDEX
-l.0 0 2 *cfat
+0.283*q+3
.319*dtat-3
9.368*dvat-
l.315*cheat
A financial constraint 
proxy, such that the higher 
the index, the more 
financially constrained the 
firm.
KZ1997 INDEX = 
- l .0 0 2 *cash flow
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (2000); 
Lamont Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001); Baker, 
Stein, and Wurgler (2003); Almeida, 
Campello, and Weisbach (2004); Hovakimian 
(2009); Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010), 
etc.
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+0.283*Tobin’s Q
+3.319*Leverage-39.368*
Dividend-l.315*Cash
WW2006
INDEX
-0.091*cfat
+0.062*div
dum+0 . 0 2 1
dlttat-0.044
*lnat+0 . 1 0 2
*industry
average(sale
-lagsale)lag
sale-0.035*(
sale-lagsale)
lagsale
A financial constraint 
proxy, such that the higher 
the index, the more 
financially constrained the 
firm.
WW2006 INDEX= 
-0.091*Cash flow 
+0.062*divdum+0.021Long 
Term Debt -0.044*Size 
+0 . 1 0 2 *industry sales 
growth-0.035*sales growth
Whited and Wu (2006); Duchin, Ozbas, and 
Sensoy (2010) ,etc.
External Dependence
EFD industry
mean
of(capx-ibc-
dpc-txdc-es
ubc-sppiv-f
opo)/capx
Industry mean proportion ot 
investment not financed by 
cash flow from operations. 
(capital expenditures - 
funds from operations) / 
capital expenditures
Rajan and Zingales (1998); Duchin, Ozbas, 
and Sensoy (2010), etc.
EED industry
median
(sstk-prstkc)
/capx
Industry median ratio of 
equity to investment. 
( sale of common and 
preferred stock - purchase 
of common and preferred 
stock)/ capital expenditures
Rajan and Zingales (1998); Duchin, Ozbas, 
and Sensoy (2010), etc.
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Appendix C: Distribution of sample firms by industry classification according 
to the U.S. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes
Industry
Code
Industry Classification First two 
SIC Code
Selection Number of 
Firms 
in Total
1 Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 01-09 YES 0
2 Mining 10-14 YES 730
3 Construction 15-17 YES 105
4 Manufacturing 20-39 YES 4469
5 Transportation, C o^unications, 
Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services
40-49 YES 715
6 Wholesale Trade 50,51 YES 369
7 Retail Trade 52-59 YES 504
Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate 60-67 NO
8 Services 70-89 YES 2460
9 Public Administration 91-99 YES 277
Total 1 0 1 2 2
Source: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division o f Corporate Finance: 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code List 
httD://www.secgoov/info/edgar/siccodes.html
52
References
Acharya, Viral V., and Timothy C. Johnson, 2007. Insider trading in credit 
derivatives. J o ^ a l  of Financial Economics 84. 1, 110-141.
Altman, Edward I, 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of 
corporate bankruptcy. The J o ^ a l  of Finance 4(23), 589-609.
Almeida, Heitor, Murillo Campello, and Michael S. Weisbach, 2004. The cash flow 
sensitivity of cash. The Journal of Finance 59(4), 1777-1804.
Almeida, Heitor, and Murillo Campello, 2007. Financial constraints, asset tangibility, 
and corporate investment. Review of Financial Studies 20.5, 1429-1460.
Ashcraft, Adam B., and Joao AC Santos, 2009. Has the CDS market lowered the cost 
of corporate debt? J o ^ a l  ofMonetary Economics 56(4), 514-523.
Aivazian, Varouj A., Ying Ge, and Jiaping Qiu, 2005. The impact ofleverage on firm 
investment: Canadian evidence. Journal o/Corporate Finance 1 1 (1): 277-91.
Baker, Malcolm, Jeremy C. Stein, and Jeffrey Wurgler, 2003. When does the market 
matter? Stock prices and the investment of equity-dependent firms. The 
Quarterly Journal ofEconomics 118(3), 969-1005.
Biddle, Gary C., Gilles Hilary, and Rodrigo S. Verdi, 2009. How does financial 
reporting quality relate to investment efficiency?. Journal ofAccounting and 
Economics 48(2), 112-131.
Bolton, Patrick, and Martin Oehmke, 2011. Credit default swaps and the empty 
creditor problem. Review o f Financial Studies 24(8), 2617-2655.
Campello, Murillo, Erasmo Giambona, John R. Graham, and Campbell R. Harvey, 
2011. Liquidity management and corporate investment during a financial 
crisis. Review ofFinancial Studies 24(6), 1944-1979.
Chava, Sudheer, and Michael R. Roberts, 2008. How does financing impact 
investment? The role of debt covenants. The Journal o f Finance 63(5), 
2085-2121.
Cleary, Sean, 1999. The relationship between firm investment and financial status. 
The Journal o f Finance 54(2) 673-692.
D’Mello, Ranjan, and Mercedes Miranda, 2010. Long-term debt and overinvestment 
agency problem. Journal a/Banking & Finance 34(2), 324-335.
Das, Sanjiv, Madhu Kalimipalli, and Subhankar Nayak, 2014. Did CDS trading 
improve the market for corporate bonds?. Journal o f Financial Economics 
111(2), 495-525.
DeAngelo, Harry, Linda DeAngelo, and Toni M. Whited, 2011. Capital structure 
dynamics and transitory debt. Journal o f Financial Economics 99(2), 235-261.
53
Denis, David J., and Valeriy Sibilkov, 2010. Financial constraints, investment, and 
the value of cash holdings. Review o f Financial Studies 23(1), 247-269.
Denis, David J., 2011. Financial flexibility and corporate liquidity. Journal o f  
Corporate Finance 17(3), 667-674.
Duchin, Ran, Oguzhan Ozbas, and Berk A. Sensoy, 2010. Costly external finance, 
corporate investment, and the subprime mortgage credit crisis. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 97(3), 418-435.
E. Leuven and B. Sianesi, 2003. PSMATCH2: Stata module to perform full 
Mahalanobis and propensity score matching, common support graphing, and 
covariate imbalance testing. http://ideas.repec.org/c7boc/bocode/s432001.htm1.
Faulkender, Michael, and Mitchell A. Petersen, 2006. Does the source of capital affect 
capital structure?. Review o f financial studies 19(1), 45-79.
Fazzari, Steven, R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen, 1988. Financing 
constraints and corporate investment. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity I, 
141-195.
Fazzari, Steven M., R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen, 2000. 
Investment-cash flow sensitivities are useful: A comment on Kaplan and 
Zingales. The Quarterly Journal ofEconomics 115(2), 695-705.
Firth, Michael, Chen Lin, and Sonia ML Wong, 2008. Leverage and investment under 
a state-owned bank lending enviro^ent: Evidence from china. Journal o f 
Corporate Finance 14 (5): 642-53.
Gomes, Joao F, 2001. Financing investment.American Economic Review 91(5), 
1263-1285.
Graham, John R., and Campbell R. Harvey, 2001. The theory and practice of 
corporate finance: evidence from the field. Journal o f Financial
Economics 60(2), 187-243.
Griffin, Paul A, 2014, The market for credit default swaps: new insights into 
investors’ use of accounting information. Accounting and Finance 54, 847-883.
Hovakimian, Gayane, 2009. Determinants of investment cash flow sensitivity. 
Financial Management 38(1), 161-183.
Hu, Henry TC, and Bernard S. Black, 2008a. Debt, equity and hybrid decoupling: 
Governance and systemic risk implications. European Financial
Management 14(4), 663-709.
Hu, Henry TC, and Bernard S. Black, 2008b. Equity and debt decoupling and empty 
voting II: Importance and extensions. as published in University o f Pennsylvania 
Law Review 156, 625-739.
Kaplan, Steven N., and Luigi Zingales, 1997. Do investment-cash flow sensitivities 
provide useful measures of financing constraints? The Quarterly Journal o f
54
Economics 112(1), 169-215.
Kahle, Kathleen M., and Rene M. Stulz, 2013. Access to capital, investment, and the 
financial crisis. Journal ofFinancial Economics, 110(2), 280-299.
Lamont, * Owen, Christopher Polk, and Jesus Saa-Requejo, 2001. Financial 
constraints and stock returns. Review ofFinancial Studies 14(2), 529-554.
Lemmon, Michael, and Michael R. Roberts, 2010. The response of corporate 
financing and investment to changes in the supply of credit, Journal o f 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45(3), 555-587.
Love I, 2003. Financial development and financing constraints: International 
evidence from the structural investment model. Review o f Financial studies, 
16(3),765-791.
Mooney C Z, Duval R D, 1993. Bootstrapping: A nonparametric approach to 
statistical inference. Sage, No. 94-95.
Moyen, Nathalie, 2004. Investment-cash flow sensitivities: constrained versus 
unconstrained firms. The Journal ofFinance 59(5), 2061-2092.
Nini, Greg, David C. Smith, and Amir Sufi, 2009. Creditor control rights and firm 
investment policy. Journal o f Financial Economics 92(3), 400-420.
Oehmke, Martin, and Adam Zawadowski, 2014. The anatomy of the CDS market. 
Available at SSRN 2023108. (workingpaper), Septermber 24.
Ozgilr, Arslan-Ayaydin, Chris Florackis, and Aydin Ozkan, 2014. Financial flexibility, 
corporate investment and performance: evidence from financial crises. Review 
o f Quantitative Finance and Accounting 42(2), 211-250.
Peristiani, Stavros, and Vanessa Savino, 2011. Are credit default swaps associated 
with higher corporate defaults?. No. 494. Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York.
Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales, 1998. Financial dependence and growth. 
American Economic Review 88, 669-586.
Ranh, Joshua D, 2006. Investment and financing constraints: Evidence from the 
funding of corporate pension plans. The Journal ofFinance 61(1), 33-71.
Roberts, Michael R., and Amir Sufi, 2009. Control rights and capital structure: An 
empirical investigation. The Journal ofFinance 64(4), 1657-1695.
Saretto, Alessio, and Heather E. Tookes, 2013. Corporate leverage, debt maturity, 
and credit supply: The role of credit default swaps. Review o f Financial 
Studies 26(5), 1190-1247.
Shan, Susan Chenyu, Dragon Yongjun Tang, and Hong Yan, 2014. Did CDS Make 
Banks Riskier? The Effects of Credit Default Swaps on Bank Capital and 
Lending. (Workingpaper), June 7.
55
Shan, Susan Chenyu, Dragon Yongjun Tang, and Andrew Winton, 2014. Do Credit 
Derivatives Lower the Value of Creditor Control Rights? Evidence from Debt 
Covenants. Evidence from Debt Covenants. (Workingpaper) November 7.
Shan, Susan Chenyu, Dragon Yongjun Tang, and Hong Yan, 2014. Regulatory 
capital and bank lending: The role o f credit default swaps. (Working paper) 
November 5.
Stein, Jeremy C, 2003. Agency, information and corporate investment. Handbook o f 
the Economics ofFinance (1), 111-165.
Subrahmanyam, Marti G., Dragon Yongjun Tang, and Sarah Qian Wang, 2013. 
Credit Default Swaps and Corporate Cash Ho\dmgs.(Working paper)
Subrahmanyam, Marti G., Dragon Yongjun Tang, and Sarah Qian Wang, 2014. Does 
the tail wag the dog? The effect of credit default swaps on credit risk. Review of 
Financial Studies, (forthcoming)
Subrahmanyam, Marti G., Dragon Yongjun Tang, and Sarah Qian Wang, 2015. 
Credit Default Swaps, Debt Financing and Corporate ■ Liquidity Management. 
(Working paper)  May 13.
Sufi, Amir, 2009. Bank lines of credit in corporate finance: An empirical analysis. 
Review ofFinancial Studies 22(3), 1057-1088.
Whited, Toni M., and Guojun Wu, 2006. Financial constraints risk. Review of 
Financial Studies 19(2), 531-559.
Wooldridge, J, 2002. Introductory Econometrics: A Modem Approach: Cincinnati. 
Ohio: South-Western College Pub,2l8-220.
56
